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DISCRETIONARY COMMODITY ACCOUNTS AS SECURITIES:
AN APPLICATION OF THE HO WEY TEST
INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1970's, trading in commodity futures contracts' has
increased dramatically.2 Many of the new participants, attracted by the
possibility of large gains with a relatively small investment,' are not fa-
miliar with the complexities of the markets.4 Thus a speculator5 will
1. A commodity futures contract is a standardized sales contract for a fixed quantity
of a commodity at a price agreed upon at the time of contracting. Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 220 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, Securities Fraud & Com-
modities Fraud § 4.6, at 82.181 (1984); 1 P. Johnson, Commodities Regulation § 1.03, at
8 (1982). Trading of futures contracts may take place only on "contract markets" desig-
nated as such by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). Commodity
Exchange Act § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982); CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d
573, 581 (9th Cir. 1982).
A futures contract "is little more than a wager that the market price of a given com-
modity will change in a given direction by a specified future date." Berman v. Bache,
Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 316 (S.D. Ohio 1979). The speculator
contracts either to take delivery or to deliver a set amount of a commodity at a later date,
usually with no intention of handling the actual commodity. See 1 P. Johnson, supra,
§ 1.04, at 9. Before the delivery date, the speculator almost always "offsets" his market
position by taking an equal and opposite position on the market-in other words, con-
tracting to deliver the commodity on which he promised to take delivery or contracting
to take delivery on the commodity he promised to deliver. Id.; H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 129 (1974). The speculator shows a profit if he buys the commodity for
less than he sells it. 1 P. Johnson, supra, § 1.04, at 9.
2. Annual trading in agricultural commodities has risen from approximately twelve
million contracts in 1970 to approximately fifty-seven million in 1983. Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System, Commodity Futures Trading Commission, & Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, A Study of the Effects on the Economy of Trading in
Futures Options, figure III-l, at 111-16 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Study]. Trading in
contracts in metals, petroleum products, currencies and other commodities has also in-
creased. Id.
One cause of the increased trading is the entrance of many new speculators into the
commodity markets. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 39 (1974) (boom in
public interest in commodities trading attributed to price leverage, low margin require-
ments and volatile price action); I A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 1, § 4.6, at
82.101 (many investors attracted from the securities markets due to falling stock prices,
rising commodity prices, inflation and dollar devaluation); 1 P. Johnson, supra note 1, at
xxvi ("increased participation. . . by wealthy private investors"). In addition, the kinds
of commodities traded have increased beyond the traditional agricultural commodities to
such items as foreign currency and pass-through certificates of the Government National
Mortgage Association (GNMAs). 1 P. Johnson, supra note I, § 1.01, at 3; see Study,
supra, at 111-23.
3. A contract market requires the speculator to deposit with his broker only a per-
centage of the contract price. 1 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 1.10, at 31. The amount of the
deposit is determined by each exchange. See Commodity Exchange Act § 8a(7)(C), 7
U.S.C. § 12a(7)(C) (1982). If the value of the contract appreciates before the investor
offsets his position, he receives the full amount of the appreciation. See I P. Johnson,
supra note 1, § 1.10, at 31-32. If the value of the contract depreciates, however, he may
lose much more than his original deposit. See id.
4. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 459 (9th Cir. 1978) (plaintiff "knew
little about the commodities market"); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96,
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often give a futures commission merchant (FCM)6 authority to buy and
sell commodities in the speculator's name without prior consultation
with the speculator.7 Such an agreement is known as a "discretionary
commodity account."'
In litigation between the speculator and his FCM,9 a common strategy
is to characterize the account as an investment contract' ° and thus a
security under the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)' and the Securities
98 (7th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff "inexperienced in commodity trading"); see also Extend
Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the Subcomm. on Conservation
and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1978) (state-
ment of Harold M. Williams, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission) (com-
modity brokers attempting to attract unsophisticated investors) [hereinafter cited as
Hearings on H.R. 10285]; H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1974) (unso-
phisticated investors attracted to commodity markets).
5. A "speculator" is a person who trades in futures contracts but who does not deal
in the actual commodity. See S. Rep. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 103 app. IX, re-
printed in 1974 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 5843, 5894 app IX.
6. A futures commission merchant (FCM):
shall mean and include individuals, associations, partnerships, corporations,
and trusts engaged in soliciting or in accepting orders for the purchase or sale of
any commodity for future delivery on or subject to the rules of any contract
market and that, in or in connection with such solicitation or acceptance of
orders, accepts any money, securities, or property (or extends credit in lieu
thereof) to margin, guarantee, or secure any trades or contracts that result or
may result therefrom.
Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
7. See, ag., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 459-60 (9th Cir. 1978) (defendant
not required to notify investor before transaction); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc.,
561 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1977) (plaintiff executed power of attorney giving defendant
power to trade in plaintiff's name).
Even experienced commodity speculators may open discretionary accounts because
they are unable to supervise their accounts on a full-time basis, which is a necessity as
rapid price fluctuations require quick decisions. See Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980), affid on other grounds, 456 U.S.
353 (1982); 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 1, § 4.6, at 82.201.
8. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
221 (6th Cir. 1980), affid on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Brodt v. Bache & Co.,
595 F.2d 459, 459 (9th Cir. 1978); Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufman & Doty, Ltd. v.
Price, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 99,682, at 97,744 (D.D.C.
Feb. 16, 1984), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Popham, Haik, Schnobrich, Kaufman &
Doty, Ltd. v. Newcomb Sec. Co., 751 F.2d 1262 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
9. See, e.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 816 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 219 (6th Cir. 1980), afJ'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Re-
search Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 98 (7th Cir. 1977); Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jack-
son & Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,867, at 94,512-
13 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1982).
10. See, e.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980), affid on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Re-
search Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th Cir. 1977); In re Federal Bank & Trust Co. Sec.
Litig., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,565, at 98,876 (D. Or. June
4, 1984); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass 1981).
11. Section 2 of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) provides that: "[U]nless the con-
text otherwise requires-(1) The term 'security' means any note, stock, treasury stock,
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Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act)' 2 (collectively, Securities Acts). 3 If the
FCM has failed to register the account with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC),' 4 the speculator may rescind the account contract
and obtain restitution of his entire investment.' 5 To recover, the specula-
tor need prove only that the account fits within the statutory definition of
"security" and that the FCM failed to register it with the SEC. 6
The first part of this Note argues that a discretionary commodity ac-
count falls within the definition of "investment contract" and as such is
deemed a security under the Securities Acts. Part II asserts, however,
that most discretionary commodity accounts are comprehensively regu-
lated under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), and that it is therefore
unnecessary to subject them to the strictures of the federal securities
laws.
bond, debenture, evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any
profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or sub-
scription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, [or] certificate of
deposit for a security .... " 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
12. Section 3 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 C34 Act) provides that:
"[Uless the context otherwise requires. . . (10) The term 'security' means any note,
stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-
sharing agreement or in any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust
certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment con-
tract, voting-trust certificate, [or] certificate of deposit for a security. . . ." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78c(10) (1982) (emphasis added).
13. The Supreme Court has "consistently held that the definition of 'security' in the
1934 Act is essentially the same as the definition of 'security' in the. . . Securities Act of
1933." Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 n.3 (1982). Therefore, this Note will
refer to the two definitions as if they were one.
14. See Securities Act of 1933, § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1982) (issuers of securities must
register the securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission).
15. Any person who. . . offers or sells a security in violation [of the registration
requirements of the '33 Act] shall be liable to the person purchasing such secur-
ity from him. . . [for] the consideration paid for such security with interest
thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, upon the tender of
such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security.
Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982).
Plaintiffs often join their request for rescission and restitution with a securities fraud
claim under § 10(b) of the '34 Act, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b) (1982). See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 219 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other
grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 99 (7th
Cir. 1977); In re Federal Bank & Trust Co. Sec. Litig., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCII) $ 91,565, at 98,875 (D. Or. June 4, 1984).
16. Securities Act of 1933, § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1982). The investor need not show
any fault on the part of the promoter. See Lewis v. Walston & Co., 487 F.2d 617, 621 (5th
Cir. 1973) (plaintiff may recover without any showing of "fault, negligent or inten-
tional"); Wolf v. Banco Nacional de Mexico, 549 F. Supp. 841, 853 (N.D. Cal. 1982)
(liability absolute), rev'd on other grounds, 739 F.2d 1458 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 784 (1985); Mason v. Marshall, 412 F. Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Tex. 1974) (no
need to prove reliance or materiality), affd per curiam, 531 F.2d 1274 (5th Cir. 1976); cf.
Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274, 275 (7th Cir.) ("Plaintiffs... sought
to rescind the discretionary trading account and to recover their deposit, plus interest
. ... "), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972).
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I. A DISCRETIONARY COMMODITY ACCOUNT AS AN INVESTMENT
CONTRACT
When a discretionary commodity account has been alleged to be a se-
curity under the Securities Acts, the courts have universally decided the
issue by considering whether the account is an investment contract.1 7
The term "investment contract," however, is not defined in either of the
Securities Acts or in any legislative report."8 This section discusses the
judicially created definition of investment contract, the federal courts'
diverse applications of the definition to discretionary commodity ac-
counts and the proper application of the definition to such accounts.
A. The Howey Case
"Investment contract" was defined by the Supreme Court in Securities
& Exchange Commission v. W.J Howey Co. 19 The SEC brought an ac-
tion to enjoin the sale of what it claimed were unregistered securities.2"
The specific issue before the Court was whether the offerings by W.J.
Howey Company were investment contracts under section two of the '33
Act.2
1
Howey was a Florida citrus grower that for several years had planted
about 500 acres of orange trees annually.22 Each year the company
would offer approximately half of the acres of new groves for sale to the
public. 23 The public purchasers bought relatively small areas of the new
groves.24 With each purchase the company offered to service the acreage,
stressing that "it is not feasible to invest in a grove unless service arrange-
ments are made."' 25 The service contract gave Howey exclusive posses-
sion of the land, and the landowner had no right to any specific fruit.26
Profits from each purchaser's tract were allocated by crop volume esti-
mates made at each tract at the time of picking.27 Oranges from the en-
17. See, e.g., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980), aJfd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Moody v. Bache &
Co., 570 F.2d 523, 526 (5th Cir. 1978); Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96,
99 (7th Cir. 1977); Commercial Iron & Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 41-42
(10th Cir. 1973); Westlake v. Abrams, 565 F. Supp. 1330, 1338 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Gamble
v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 99,046, at 94,987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1982).
18. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946); SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods.
Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 581 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086 (1982); SEC v. Paro, 468
F. Supp. 635, 643 (N.D.N.Y. 1979).
19. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
20. Id. at 294.
21. Id. at 297.
22. Id. at 294-95.
23. Id. at 295.
24. Id.
25. Id.




tire grove were then pooled and sold.2" The income from the sale was
then distributed to the landowners in accordance with the pre-picking
estimate.29
In determining whether Howey had offered to enter into investment
contracts, the Court found that the term "investment contract" was com-
mon in state "blue sky laws" 30 and "had been crystallized by. . .judi-
cial interpretation."31 The Court adopted the definition of investment
contract that had been "uniformly applied by state courts": 32 "An invest-
ment contract. . . means a contract, transaction or scheme whereby a
person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect
profits solely from the efforts of the promoter or a third party. .. .
Courts that have interpreted Howey often break this definition into three
components: an investment of money, in a common enterprise, with the
expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others.34
The Howey Court noted that this definition "embodies a flexible rather
than a static principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the use of the
money of others on the promise of profits." 35 Thus, Howey's flexible defi-
nition comports with Congress' use of the concept "investment contract"
as a catch-all to bring various investment schemes within the ambit of
federal securities regulation. 36 Accordingly, the Court held that Howey's
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See id. at 298. The name "blue sky laws" was given to state laws that sought to
protect investors from "speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet
of 'blue sky.'" Hall v. Geiger-Jones Co., 242 U.S. 539, 550 (1917).
31. SEC v. WJ. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 298-99. The Court has reaffirmed this definition several times. See, e g.,
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982); International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 558 (1979); United Housing Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852
(1975).
34. See, e.g., Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216,
221 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Moody v. Bache & Co.,
570 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1978); Clayton Brokerage Co. v. Stansfield, 582 F. Supp. 837,
840 (D. Colo. 1984); Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga.
1983); American Grain Ass'n v. Canfield, Burch & Mancuso, [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 98,695, at 93,473 (W.D. La. Feb. 1, 1982).
35. 328 U.S. at 299.
36. See Golden v. Garafalo, 678 F.2d 1139, 1144 (2d Cir. 1982) (Congress intended
"investment contract" to be a catch-all.); cf. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299
(1946) (broad definition permits fulfillment of statutory purpose of bringing various in-
vestments within the Securities Acts); H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1933)
(term "security" sufficiently broad to bring many investments within ordinary concept of
a security); 1 L. Loss, Securites Regulation 483 (2d ed. 1961) (section entitled "Invest-
ment Contracts and the Other Catchall Varieties").
A clear purpose of Congress in defining "security" broadly was to afford investors
protection under comprehensive federal law. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,
195 (1976); Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967); cf. H.R. Rep. No. 85, 73d




offering constituted an offer to enter into an investment contract.3 7 The
land transaction underlying Howey's offer was not an investment con-
tract, 38 but purchasers had invested money in a common enterprise with
an expectation of profits solely from Howey's efforts. 39
B. Treatment of Discretionary Commodity Accounts in the Federal
Courts
The courts have not considered futures contracts to be investment con-
tracts.4° A futures contract involves no reliance on the efforts of others
because the speculator's "expectation of profit arises solely from the spec-
ulative hope that the market price of the underlying commodity will vary
in his favor, permitting purchase or sale at a profit."' 4' As shown in
Howey, however, an underlying transaction need not involve a security in
order for the packaging of such a transaction to be a security.42 Thus, a
discretionary commodity account may be a security even though a fu-
tures contract is not.43
The federal courts agree that discretionary commodity accounts meet
the first prong of the Howey test: The accounts are an investment of
money." As for the third Howey requirement-that the investor expect
profits "solely" from the efforts of others4 5-the federal courts of appeals
require only that "the efforts made by those other than the investor [be]
the undeniably significant ones."'46 Thus, the third prong of Howey
37. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. The Court held that the '33 Act prohibits the offer as
well as the sale of unregistered securities. See id. Thus, even though the investors were
not required to enter into a service contract with Howey, the offer was sufficient to invoke
the '33 Act. See id. at 300-01.
38. See id. at 299 ("offering something more than fee simple interests in land").
39. Id. ("The transactions in this case clearly involve investment contracts as so
defined.").
40. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th
Cir. 1980), afid on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Moody v. Bache & Co., 570 F.2d
523, 525 (5th Cir. 1978); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903,
905 (D. Minn. 1981); see Gamble v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., [1982-
1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 99,046, at 99,987 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 30, 1982);
Hearings on H.R. 10285, supra note 4, at 192 (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chair-
man, SEC).
41. McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. La. 1972), affid
per curiam, 477 F.2d 113 (5th Cir. 1973); accord P & C Investment Club v. Becker, 520
F. Supp. 120, 122 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F.
Supp. 311, 315-16 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
42. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
43. Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 221 (6th
Cir. 1980), afl'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); see Commercial Iron & Metal Co.
v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v.
Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 905 (D. Minn 1981).
44. See, e.g., Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978); Clayton Bro-
kerage Co. v. Stansfield, 582 F. Supp. 837, 840 (D. Colo. 1984); Taylor v. Bear Stearns &
Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Troyer v. Karcagi, 476 F. Supp. 1142, 1147
(S.D.N.Y. 1979).
45. Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99.
46. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
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should be satisfied if the promoter dominates the control of the ac-
count.47 The center of the controversy concerns the second require-
ment-whether a discretionary commodity account is a common
enterprise.4 The remainder of this section discusses the circuit courts'
differing analyses of the common enterprise requirement.
414 U.S. 821 (1973); see SEC v. Professional Assocs., 731 F.2d 349, 357 (6th Cir. 1984);
Goodwin v. Elkins & Co., 730 F.2d 99, 103 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 118 (1984);
SEC v. Aqua-Sonic Prods. Corp., 687 F.2d 577, 582 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1086
(1982); Kim v. Cochenour, 687 F.2d 210, 213 n.7 (7th Cir. 1982); Williamson v. Tucker,
645 F.2d 404, 418 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 897 (1981); SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d
633, 641 (9th Cir. 1980); Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1040 n.3
(10th Cir. 1980); Fargo Partners v. Dain Corp., 540 F.2d 912, 914-15 (8th Cir. 1976); cf.
Long, An Attempt to Return "Investment Contracts" to the Mainstream of Securities Reg-
ulation, 24 Okla. L. Rev. 135, 155 (1971) (none of the state definitions of investment
contract cited by Howey used the word "solely").
The First and Fourth Circuits have not decided the issue. The Eleventh Circuit has
expressly refrained from doing so. See Villeneuve v. Advanced Business Concepts Corp.,
730 F.2d 1403, 1404 n.2 (l1th Cir. 1984).
47. One who enters into a discretionary commodity account almost by definition relies
solely on the efforts of others. However, if an investor did participate minimally in the
account, there is no reason to believe that the courts would require a stricter "solely"
standard for discretionary commodity accounts than they do for investment contracts in
general.
48. Mordaunt v. Incomco, 105 S. CL 801, 802 (1985) (White, I., dissenting from
denial of certiorari); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d
216, 221 (6th Cir. 1980), aff'd on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Holtzman v. Proc-
tor, Cook & Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981); see Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d
815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); SEC v. Continental Com-
modities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 520 (5th Cir. 1974); In re Federal Bank & Trust Co. Sec.
Litig., [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,565, at 98,876 (D. Or. June
4, 1984).
After attempting to bar Continental Commodities from offering unregistered discre-
tionary commodity accounts to the public, see SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp.,
497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974), the SEC has not taken a position on whether discretionary
commodity accounts are securities, see A. G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., Investment Advisers
Act of 1940 Release No. 1-6866, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L Rep. (CCH)
80,153 (Mar. 28, 1975) (SEC refused, due to "unsettled" case law, to issue no-action
letter on issue whether discretionary commodity accounts are securities). In any event,
the views of a federal agency have persuasive, but no binding effect on judicial interpreta-
tion of federal statutes. See Dirks v. SEC, 103 S. Ct 3255, 3262 (1983) (Court rejects
SEC's interpretation of the '34 Act's antifraud provision.); NLRB v. Yeshiva University,
444 U.S. 672, 691 (1980) (Court rejects NLRB's analysis of the concept "managerial
status"); 5 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 29.15, at 394 (2d ed. 1984) ("Courts
commonly substitute their own policy ideas for those of specialized agencies."); cf. Letter
from Harvey L. Pitt, General Counsel, SEC, to Judge Frank A. Kaufman (May 27,
1976), reprinted in Pargas, Inc. v. Empire Gas Corp., 423 F. Supp. 199, 251-52 app. G
(D. Md.) (citation of "no action" letter as precedent for interpreting the federal securities
laws is inappropriate), af'd, 546 F.2d 25 (1976).
Discretionary commodity accounts should be distinguished from commodity pools. In
a commodity pool the promoter pools the money of several investors and speculates in
the commodity markets by using the pooled funds as deposits on futures contracts. I P.
Johnson, supra note 1, § 1.15, at 52. The investors share in the profits in accordance with
the amount of their investment. Id. The 1983 amendments to the Commodity Exchange
Act expressly recognize that commodity pools are subject to the '33 and '34 Acts (Securi-
ties Acts). See Futures Trading Act of 1982, § 103, Pub. L. No. 97-444, § 103, 96 Stat.




In Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc. , the plaintiff claimed that his
discretionary commodity account was a security and that the defendant
was liable under the Securities Acts for various material5° misrepresenta-
tions51 and for failure to register the account with the SEC. 52 The Sev-
enth Circuit held that a pooling of investors' funds or a pro rata
distribution of profits among investors is required to satisfy the common
enterprise element of Howey.53 That is, unless the investors' funds are
either commingled or the fortunes of all investors rise and fall together,
the investment does not constitute an investment contract. This pooling
or pro rata sharing is called "horizontal commonality." 54 Because Hirk's
account was an individual discretionary account, 55 the court held that
the account lacked the requisite horizontal commonality.5 6 The court
further held that the entrance of Agri-Research into a number of such
accounts with investors did not provide this commonality. Thus, Hirk's
account was not an investment contract and was not subject to the Se-
curities Acts.5"
Although Howey used the phrase "common enterprise" without defin-
ing it,59 Hirk supported its requirement of horizontal commonality by
49. 561 F.2d 96 (7th Cir. 1977).
50. See infra note 142.
51. See Hirk, 561 F.2d at 98. (regarding defendant's market experience and the profit-
ability of the account).
52. Id. at 99.
53. See id. at 100-01.
54. Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 460 (9th Cir. 1978); see, e.g., Holtzman v.
Proctor, Cook & Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass 1981); Walsh v. International Precious
Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah 1981); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F.
Supp. 1225, 1236 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
The Seventh Circuit's requirement of horizontal commonality has been adopted by the
Third and Sixth Circuits. See Salcer v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 682
F.2d 459, 460 (3d Cir. 1982); Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622
F.2d 216, 222 (6th Cir. 1980), affid on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982). Although the
First Circuit has not decided the issue, the district courts in Maine and Massachusetts
have followed the Seventh Circuit view. See Xaphes v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner &
Smith, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 213, 216 (D. Me. 1984); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 528
F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981).
55. See Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101 (7th Cir. 1977).
56. See id.
57. See id. (court relied on Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), which held that an individual account contract
was not an investment contract but merely an "agency-for-hire," id. at 277) Similarly, the
Fifth Circuit in Howey held that Howey's offer was not an offer to enter into an invest-
ment contract because the Howey Company was to be a mere agent; otherwise every
purchase/management contract would be a security. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151
F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). Thus, the Seventh Circuit's
conclusion that an agency contract cannot be an investment contract is inconsistent with
the Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals in Howey.
58. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 101-02 (7th Cir. 1977).
59. See Howey, 328 U.S. at 298-99, 301.
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pointing to the fact that the oranges in Howey were pooled.' Thus, the
Seventh Circuit concluded that horizontal commonality is a necessary
element of any investment contract.61 The funds of the Howey investors,
however, were not pooled. An investor's payments were either for the
initial purchase or for the servicing of the individual tract.62 As noted in
Hirk, the fact that the promoter enters into a number of similar contracts
does not provide the pooling sufficient for horizontal commonality.63 In
addition, there was no pro rata distribution of profits. As discussed
above, the profits in Howey were based on an estimate of the yield of each
tract.61 The pooling was done after the profit estimate.65 The court of
appeals in Howey noted this independence of the investor's fortunes: "It
is quite clear. . that each purchaser's income was in no sense depen-
dent upon the purchase or development of other tracts than his own ex-
cept in the sense that as grove owners generally prospered, each owner of
a grove would."' 66 The court of appeals concluded that this independence
precluded the existence of an investment contract. 67 Therefore, the
Supreme Court's reversal of the court of appeals logically means that
neither the pooling of funds nor the pro rata distribution of profits-
horizontal commonality-is a necessary element of an investment
contract.
2. Vertical Commonality
The Ninth Circuit has defined a common enterprise as "one in which
the fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the
efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third parties."
61
Thus, in the Ninth Circuit the common enterprise requirement is satis-
fied not only when there is a pooling or a pro rata sharing, but also when
the fortunes of the investor and the promoter rise or fall together.69 Such
60. See Hirk, 561 F.2d at 101.
61. See id.
62. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 295-96 (1946).
63. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
64. See supra text accompanying note 27.
65. See supra text accompanying note 28.
66. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 717 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S. 293
(1946). The plaintiff in Milnarik v. M-S Commodities, Inc., 457 F.2d 274 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972), pointed out the independence of the investors' fortunes in
Howey. Id. at 279. The court, however, held that the individual aspect of the investment
in Howey "did not obscure the economic reality of participation in a common enterprise.'"
Id.
67. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 151 F.2d 714, 717-18 (5th Cir. 1945), rev'd, 328 U.S.
293 (1946).
68. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
69. To establish common enterprise in this way, the Ninth Circuit requires only that
the fortunes of the investor and promoter rise or fall together. See Mordaunt v. Incomco,
686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Brodt v. Bache &
Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978).
It does, however, require a direct correlation between the fortunes of the investor and
those of the promoter. See Meyer v. Thomas & McKinnon Auchincloss Kohlmeyer, Inc.,
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a relationship between the promoter and the investor is known as "verti-
cal commonality."7 °
The Ninth Circuit bases its broader view not on the text of Howey, but
on the remedial purposes of the Securities Acts and the Supreme Court's
directive of flexibility.71 Even the looser standard of vertical commonal-
ity, however, is more than the Howey decision requires. The Howey
Company's own monetary interest in each tract was limited to its service
contract.72 That is, there was no vertical commonality in Howey because
the profits from each tract did not directly benefit the Howey Company.
3. Dominance Commonality
In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc.,,
the Fifth Circuit was asked to decide whether a pyramid scheme 74 was a
security within the meaning of the Securities Acts. 75 As in Howey,76 the
SEC sued to enjoin the promotional enterprise for failure to register its
offering as a security.77 In the Koscot scheme, an individual investor re-
alized a profit only if he attracted new investors to the scheme.78 The
fortunes of the investors were therefore independent,79 but the court held
that this fact was not decisive: "Rather, the requisite commonality is evi-
denced by the fact that the fortunes of all investors are inextricably tied
686 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1982) (promoter received percentage of assets managed, but
because investor could withdraw funds from account, promoter would not necessarily
have shared profits), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1023 (1983); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d
459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978) (no direct correlation because Bache could earn large commis-
sions while investor could be "wiped out").
70. See, eg., Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); Savino v.
E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
Several district courts have adopted this broader view. See, e.g., Taylor v. Bear Steams
& Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Walsh v. International Precious Metals
Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah 1981); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp.
1225, 1239 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Christensen Hatch Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp.
903, 906-07 (D. Minn. 1981).
The Eighth and Tenth Circuits had decided that discretionary commodity accounts
may be securities before the Ninth Circuit in Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461
(9th Cir. 1978), first discussed the vertical commonality analysis. See Commercial Iron &
Metal Co. v. Bache & Co., 478 F.2d 39, 42 (10th Cir. 1973); Booth v. Peavey Co. Com-
modity Services, 430 F.2d 132, 133 (8th Cir. 1970).
71. See Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429,432 (9th Cir. 1976). See supra notes 35-65 and
accompanying text.
72. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 296 (1946).
73. 497 F.2d 473 (5th Cir. 1974).
74. A pyramid scheme is a multilevel distribution system in which a participant
makes a profit by recruiting others to lower levels of the pyramid. Securities Act Release
No. 9387, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 78,446, at 80,974
(Nov. 30, 1971).
75. See SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 474-75 (5th Cir. 1974).
76. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 294 (1946).
77. SEC v. Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 497 F.2d 473, 474 (5th Cir. 1974).
78. See id. at 475.
79. Id. at 479.
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to the efficacy of ... Koscot ... ."0 In effect, Koscot eliminates the
common enterprise requirement by holding that dominance by the pro-
moter-the third Howey requirement-supplies the necessary common
enterprise.81
Koscot was followed two days later by Securities & Exchange Commis-
sion v. Continental Commodities,82 in which the SEC sought to enjoin the
sale of unregistered discretionary commodity accounts.83 The Fifth Cir-
cuit found that Continental's commissions were based on the number of
transactions it completed for its client.84 Because Continental was not
affected by the performance of an investor's account, there was no verti-
cal commonality between Continental and the investor.85
Continental relied on Koscot, holding that Koscot "decried a litmus ap-
plication of the Howey test and expressed its preference for a resilient
standard which would comport with the uniformly acclaimed remedial
purposes of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934." 86 Although the fortunes of the investor and the promoter were
not intertwined,87 the court held that the "critical inquiry is confined to
whether the fortuity of the investments collectively is essentially depen-
dent upon promoter expertise."88 The court then expressly rejected a re-
quirement of horizontal commonality89 and concluded that Continental
was offering to enter into a common enterprise.90
Because the fortunes of Continental and the investor were not inter-
twined, the court's holding can only mean that promoter dominance
alone satisfied the commonality requirement. 9' The Fifth Circuit's com-
mon enterprise test has been referred to as vertical commonality,9
although it is clearly distinguishable from the Ninth Circuit's version of
vertical commonality. 93 This Note refers to the Fifth Circuit's interpreta-
80. Id.
81. See infra note 91 and accompanying text.
82. 497 F.2d 516 (5th Cir. 1974).
83. Id. at 517.
84. See id. at 519 (speculator paid Continental for option to enter into a futures
contract).
85. See supra note 69. The court in Continental did not use the phrase "vertical com-
monality" because it had not yet been coined.
86. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 521.
87. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
88. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d at 522.
89. See id.
90. See id. at 522-23.
91. See Taylor v. Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Holtz-
man v. Proctor, Cook & Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981); Berman v Bache,
Halsey, Stuart, Shields Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio 1979).
92. See Brodt v. Bache & Co., 595 F.2d 459, 461 (9th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Bear
Stearns & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983); Holtzman v. Proctor, Cook &
Co., 528 F. Supp. 9, 15 (D. Mass. 1981).
93. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d 815, 817 (9th Cir. 1982) (merely furnishing
investment counsel to another for a commission does not amount to a "common enter-
prise," though it would provide the requisite commonality in the Fifth Circuit), cert.
denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Savino v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 507 F. Supp. 1225, 1237 &
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tion of the common enterprise element as "dominance commonality."
C. The Correct Reading of Howey
Although Continental's dominance commonality seems to alter sub-
stantially the Howey definition of "investment contract," the Fifth Cir-
cuit's view has both factual support in Howey9 4 and textual support in
the Securities Acts.9 5 In addition, the Howey Court found that as states
developed a working definition of "investment contract," it came to
mean a contract for "the placing of capital or laying out of money in a
way intended to secure income or profit from its employment." 96 The
Court then paraphrased this state definition in what is now known as the
"Howey test." 97 The state definition, however, contains no language of
"common enterprise," and the Court did not state that its formulation of
the definition was to differ from that of the states.98 Further, none of the
state cases cited by the Court9 9 requires the element of common
enterprise. 1°°
A requirement of horizontal or vertical commonality thus has no basis
in either the state origins or the fact pattern of Howey.'01 Although the
Supreme Court did use the phrase "common enterprise" in its para-
n.11 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (Fifth Circuit view broader than the Ninth Circuit view). Some
courts, however, do not note the distinction between the two circuits. See, e.g., Taylor v.
Bear Steams & Co., 572 F. Supp. 667, 671 (N.D. Ga. 1983) (no distinction made between
Fifth and Ninth Circuits' definitions of "vertical commonality"); Christensen Hatch
Farms, Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 906 (D. Minn. 1981) (court stated that the
Fifth Circuit had adopted the Ninth Circuit's test for vertical commonality).
94. As noted above, the Howey Company's offer contained neither horizontal nor
vertical commonality. See supra notes 59-67, 72 and accompanying text.
95. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
96. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298 (1946) (quoting State v. Gopher Tire
& Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)).
97. See id. at 298.
98. See id.
99. See id. at 298 n.4.
100. See People v. White, 124 Cal. App. 548, 555, 12 P.2d 1078, 1081 (1932) (invest-
ment of "money in expectation of a profit from the investment") (citing with approval
State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937, 938 (1920)); Pro-
haska v. Hemmer-Miller Dev. Co., 256 Ill. App. 331, 343 (1930) (investment of money
"into far-off speculative enterprises over which the investor has little or no control")
(quoting with approval Kerst v. Nelson, 171 Minn. 191, 195, 213 N.W. 904, 905 (1927));
State v. Evans, 154 Minn. 95, 99, 191 N.W. 425, 426 (1922) ("placing of capital or laying
out of money in a way intended to secure income or profit from its employment") (quot-
ing with approval State v. Gopher Tire & Rubber Co., 146 Minn. 52, 56, 177 N.W. 937,
938 (1920)); State v. Heath, 199 N.C. 135, 140, 153 S.E. 855, 858 (1930) (investment of
money "upon the promise and just expectation that the investment would return a profit
without any active effort on the part of the investors").
Three of the state cases cited in Howey neither involved nor defined investment con-
tracts. See Moore v. Stella, 52 Cal. App. 2d 766, 127 P.2d 300 (1942) (issue whether deed
to mineral rights is a security); Stevens v. Liberty Packing Corp., 111 N.J. Eq. 61, 161 A.
193 (1932) (issue whether contract to lease and sell rabbits is a security); Klatt v. Guaran-
teed Bond Co., 213 Wis. 12, 250 N.W. 825 (1933) (issue whether a corporate bond is a
security).
101. See supra notes 59-67, 72, 98-100 and accompanying text.
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phrase of the state definitions,'0 2 it should be clear that what seemed like
an alteration of the Howey definition by the Fifth Circuit is in reality the
most faithful explication of the Howey test. 0 3 In addition, the Fifth Cir-
cuit's reading of Howey follows the Supreme Court's direction that "in-
vestment contract" should be interpreted broadly to effect the remedial
purposes of the Securities Acts. "0 It also comports with Congress' intent
that the category "investment contract" be a catch-all for various invest-
ment devices so that they can be brought within some regulatory
scheme. 105
Thus, the application of Howey's broad definition to discretionary
commodity accounts clearly brings those accounts within the definition
of investment contract. The opening of a discretionary commodity ac-
count is an investment of money with an expectation of profits from the
substantial efforts of the promoter.
II. LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE SECURITIES ACTS
This Note has argued that the Howey definition of "investment con-
tract" is to be construed broadly to effect the congressional purpose be-
hind the Securities Acts. This broad reading, however, is qualified by
statute. Each statutory definition of "security" lists a number of invest-
ment devices, including investment contracts, that are securities, but pre-
ceding each list is the caveat "unless the context otherwise requires."' 0 6
This section interprets the meaning of this caveat and examines its impli-
cations for discretionary commodity accounts.
102. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298-99 (1946).
103. But see Curran v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 622 F.2d 216, 224
(6th Cir. 1980) ("Although the precise meaning of the phrase 'common enterprise' is far
from clear, nowhere in Howey or later Supreme Court decisions is it intimated that that
phrase is somehow redundant of other elements of the definition of a security.") (quoting
with approval Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D.
Ohio 1979)), affid on other grounds, 456 U.S. 353 (1982).
104. See SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946) (broad reading permits
fulfillment of purpose of Securities Acts); see also Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332,
336 (1967) ('34 Act "should be construed broadly to effectuate its purposes.").
105. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. The Fifth Circuit's broad reading also
avoids the tenuous distinction between commodity pools, which are clearly regulated
under the Securities Acts, see supra note 48, and discretionary commodity accounts. See
Walsh v. International Precious Metals Corp., 510 F. Supp. 867, 871 (D. Utah 1981)
("[lit makes no sense to penalize the single investor simply because he happens to be
alone in his misfortune.").
It should be noted here that the horizontal and vertical commonality tests are not
restricted to analysis of discretionary commodity accounts, but are used generally in con-
nection with the Howey definition of "investment contract." See, e.g., United States v.
Jones, 712 F.2d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir.) (vertical commonality rendered sale/leaseback
transaction a security), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 434 (1983); Union Planters Nat'l Bank v.
Commercial Credit Business Loans, Inc., 651 F.2d 1174, 1185 (6th Cir.) (loan participa-
tion agreement did not constitute security), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1124 (1981).
106. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 3, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (1982); Securities Act of
1933, § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 77b (1982). For the text of the statutes, see supra notes 11 and 12.
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A. Pre-emption of the Securities Acts
The Supreme Court has interpreted the definitional caveat to mean
that the Securities Acts do not apply to an investment that is already
comprehensively regulated at the federal level. ' 07 In International Broth-
erhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, 10 8 the Court was asked to decide whether
noncontributory, compulsory pension plans were securities under the Se-
curities Acts." 9 The Court noted the "existence of. . . comprehensive
legislation governing"' the plans and held that the existence of such
legislation "severely undercuts all arguments for extending the Securities
Acts" to include them."' In Marine Bank v. Weaver," 2 the Court ex-
panded its ruling in Daniel by holding that even though the investment in
question was within the Securities Acts' definition of "security,""13 it was
unnecessary to subject that investment to the securities laws because the
investors were "abundantly protected under the federal banking laws." 114
Thus, whether an investment is an investment contract subject to the
Securities Acts involves two questions. First, does the investment fall
within Howey's broad definition of investment contract? Second, is the
investor already "comprehensively" protected at the federal level?
As argued above, discretionary commodity accounts do come within
the Howey definition of investment contract. 1 5 Most commodity ac-
counts, however, are regulated under the CEA by the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (CFTC). I6 Thus, if discretionary commodity
accounts are comprehensively regulated, they should not be subject to
the securities laws.
B. The Commodity Exchange Act and Comprehensive Regulation
In Marine Bank the Supreme Court used the term "comprehensive"
without defining it."' This subsection examines some possible meanings
of this term in the context of the regulatory measures of commodities
regulation.
107. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558-59 (1982); see also Wolf v. Banco
Nacional de Mexico, 739 F.2d 1458, 1462 (9th Cir. 1984) (alternative regulation need not
be federal as long as regulation is comprehensive), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 784 (1985).
108. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
109. See id. at 557.
110. Id. at 569.
111. Id.
112. 455 U.S. 551 (1982).
113. See id. at 556-57 (investment in question was a "certificate of interest" and thus
within the statutory definitions of "security").
114. Id. at 559.
115. See supra Pt. I.
116. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982) (The Commodity
Futures Trading Commission "shall have exclusive jurisdiction ... with respect to ac-
counts ... involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery . .
117. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 (1982).
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1. Comprehensiveness by Specificity
Daniel noted the fact that the Employment Retirement Income Secur-
ity Act of 1974 (ERISA) "deals expressly and in detail with pension
plans .... requir[ing] pension plans to disclose specified information
to employees in a specified manner.., in contrast to the indefinite and
uncertain disclosure obligations imposed by the antifraud provisions of
the Securities Acts." ' The Court went on to find that "this comprehen-
sive legislation" cuts against application of the securities laws. 9 Daniel
thus seemed to equate specificity of regulation with comprehensiveness of
regulation; in other words, if federal law deals expressly and in detail
with a type of investment, the law is comprehensive. Thus, the CEA is
comprehensive in the sense that it specifically regulates the commodities
markets. 120
2. Comprehensiveness by Purpose
In Marine Bank the Court held that the existence of federal banking
laws designed in part to protect investors 121 made it unnecessary to sub-
ject the investment to the securities laws."2 The Court may have used
the term comprehensive to mean that at least one purpose of the alterna-
tive federal regulation must be to protect investors.
The CEA, however, was not enacted to protect the speculator. It was
enacted in 1922123 in response to the complaints of farmers and
merchants that speculators were manipulating the regional commodity
markets.124 Not suprisingly, the original Act was concerned mainly with
protecting not the speculator but the people who dealt in the actual com-
modity.'" 5 By assigning enforcement of the Act to the Department of
118. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1979).
119. Id. at 569-70.
120. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 355-56
(1982) (In another context the Court found that "[tihe Commodity Exchange Act...
has been aptly characterized as 'a comprehensive regulatory structure to oversee the vola-
tile and esoteric futures trading complex.' ") (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 (1974)).
121. See H.R. Rep. No. 1948, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934) (amendments to Banking
Act of 1933 necessary to "preserve the rights of the general depositors against prefer-
ences"); H.R. Rep. No. 150, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1933) (Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation "makes absolutely safe and adequate provision for the protection of
depositors.").
122. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982).
123. The Act was originally called The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998
(1922), but its name was changed in 1936 to the Commodity Exchange Act, see Com-
modity Exchange Act, ch. 545, 49 Stat. 1491 (1936) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 1
(1982)).
124. See H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82 (1978) (sentiment of Congress in
passing the Act with agricultural producers who felt "victimized" by speculators). The
Chicago Board of Trade "was looked upon as a gambling hell," Id., and speculators were
blamed for "suicides and crimes," id. at 82-83.
125. See id. at 84 (1936 amendments expanded "the community protected under fed-
eral commodities law.. . to include speculators"); I A. Bromberg & L Lowenfels, supra
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Agriculture,'26 Congress reinforced this bias.1 27 In 1974, Congress
amended the CEA 28 to address, in part, the problems-mainly fraud-
encountered by speculators.129 The need for this change in focus of the
CEA was aggravated by the entrance of many unsophisticated specula-
tors into the market. 130 The CFTC was created by the 1974 amendments
to take over enforcement of the CEA' 3 after Congress had found that
regulation by the Department of Agriculture was inadequate.
3 2
Although the CFTC is also concerned with farmers and merchants, 1
33
Congress clearly intended the 1974 amendments to protect specula-
tors.' 34 The CEA therefore meets the comprehensiveness criterion that
investor protection be a goal of the regulation.
3. Comprehensiveness by Similarity to the Securities Acts
Daniel noted that like the Securities Acts, ERISA requires disclosure
of information concerning investments. 35 In interpreting Daniel, the
Marine Bank Court held the fact that ERISA requires disclosure made it
"unnecessary to subject pension plans to the requirements of the federal
securities laws as well."' 36 Thus "comprehensive" may describe alterna-
tive federal regulation that protects the investor in ways similar to the
Securities Acts.
note 1, § 4.6, at 82.363 ("Historically, commodities law has been designed primarily to
protect farmers.").
126. The Grain Futures Act, ch. 369, 42 Stat. 998 (1922), amended by Commodity
Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 103, 88 Stat. 1392
(codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982)).
127. See 1 A. Bromberg & L. Lowenfels, supra note 1, § 4.6, at 82.363-64 (After pas-
sage of the CEA, "[i]t is no accident that ... [it] was administered within the Depart-
ment of Agriculture."); 2 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 4.01, at 3 ("[P]rimary focus of the
Department was the general welfare and prosperity of American agriculture. .. ").
128. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982)).
129. See S. Rep. No. 850, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 12-13, reprinted in 1978 U.S. Code
Cong. and Ad. News 2087, 2100-01 (Commodity Futures Trading Commission, created
in 1974, see infra note 131, affords speculators protection from unlawful behavior of com-
modity professionals); H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 87-88 (1978) (exchange
heads considered fraud of investors to be impetus for amendments); H.R. Rep. No. 975,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. 48-49 (1974) (A consideration leading to the 1974 amendments was
the "[e]xistence of schemes of systematic solicitations and bilking of unsophisticated po-
tential customers.").
130. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
131. See Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463,
88 Stat. 1389 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C. (1982)).
132. See H.R. Rep. No. 1181, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 88 (1978) ("[Tlhe Department of
Agriculture's Commodity Exchange Authority could not enforce existing law" because of
the small size of its staff); see also 1 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 1.79, at 176 (Department
of Agriculture had no expertise in nonagricultural commodities).
133. See Commodity Exchange Act § 3, 7 U.S.C. § 5 (1982) (commodities futures
must be regulated to protect the producer or the consumer and persons handling com-
modities); 2 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 4.01, at 4 (CFTC not insensitive to agriculture).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
135. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 569 (1979).
136. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 558 n.7 (1982)
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THE HOWEY TEST
Like the protective disclosure requirement of the Securities Acts,' 3 '
the CEA is designed to protect investors through disclosure.' 38 The dis-
closure requirements under the CEA require individuals and firms in-
volved in the trading of futures contracts to register with the CFTC.139
The registration is extensive"4 and specifically designed to guard against
commodity fraud."'
In connection with the disclosure requirement, the '34 Act seeks to
protect investors against material misrepresentations' 42 by allowing them
137. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976) ('The Securities Act of
1933 ... was designed to provide investors with full disclosure of material information
concerning public offering of securities ... to protect investors against fraud. .. .");
Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (One of the central purposes of the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 is "to protect investors through the requirement of full
disclosure."); S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1934) (Registration "provisions
are regarded as the minimum which is requisite for the adequate protection of
investors.").
138. The registration requirement allows the CFTC to determine whether a person is
fit to engage in the desired business. See 1 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 3.02, at 427; cf.
Commodity Exchange Act § 8a(3)(M), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(3)(M) (1982) (Commission is au-
thorized to refuse to register any person if it is found that there is good cause for doing
so). To make its determination of fitness, the Commission is allowed a free hand in decid-
ing what the applicant must disclose. Id. § 8a(1), 7 U.S.C. § 12a(l).
Almost all registration information concerning an FCM is available to the public. See
CFTC Form 7-R, reprinted in 1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 3515, at 3606 (Mar. 1984)
[hereinafter cited as Form 7-R]. For a list of FCM information not available to the pub-
lic, see infra note 140.
139. See Commodity Exchange Act § 4f, 7 U.S.C. § 6f (1982) (registration of futures
commission merchants, introducing brokers and floor brokers); id. § 4k, 7 U.S.C. § 6k
(registration of associates of futures commission merchants, commodity pool operators,
and commodity trading advisors); id. § 4n, 7 U.S.C. § 6n (registration of commodity
trading advisors and commodity pool operators).
140. For example, each application for registration as an FCM must be on CFTC
Form 7-R. 17 C.F.R. § 3.10 (1984). Form 7-R requires that an FCM applicant must
disclose, inter alia, its criminal, regulatory and civil record, Form 7-R, supra note 138, at
3611 to 3611-2, as well as its present business structure, id. at 3609-10. All information
that is required on Form 7-R is available to the public, id. at 3606, except the date and
place of birth of each principal and branch manager of an FCM, id.
In addition, any person who is associated with a futures commission merchant as a
partner, officer or employee and who is involved in the solicitation or acceptance of cus-
tomers' orders or who supervises such a person must register with the CFTC. Commod-
ity Exchange Act § 4k, 7 U.S.C. § 6k (1982). Each associated person (AP) must disclose
his criminal, regulatory and civil record to the CFTC. See CFTC Form 8-R, reprinted in
1 Comm. Fut. L. Rep. (CCH) 3521, at 3621 to 3621-3 (Mar. 1984). This information
concerning the AP's disciplinary history, however, is not available to the public. Id. at
3613. For a thorough discussion of the CFTC's registration process, see 1 P. Johnson,
supra note 1, §§ 3.01-3.32, at 426-60.
141. Commodity Futures Trading Commission Oversight: Hearing Before a Subcomin.
of the Comm. on Government Operations, House of Representatives, 97th Cong., 2d Sess.
811 app. 4 (1982) (GAO Report, Improvements to CFTC's Registration Program Could
Provide Better Customer Protection); 1 P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 3, at 424-25; cf. Mer-
rill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 390 (1982) (CEA in-
tended to protect futures traders from fraudulent conduct); Christensen Hatch Farms,
Inc. v. Peavey Co., 505 F. Supp. 903, 910 (D. Minn. 1981) (primary purpose of CEA is
protection from fraud).
142. Under SEC Rule lOb-5 misrepresentations are actionable only if material. 17
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a private cause of action for securities fraud. 14 3 The CEA antifraud stat-
ute'" uses "identical language"' 45 and allows a fraud action against an
FCM for any material misrepresentations concerning an investor's dis-
cretionary commodity account.146 Thus it is apparent that the CEA pro-
tects the investor in ways similar to the Securities Acts.
4. Comprehensiveness by Scope: Where the Securities Laws Apply
Marine Bank based its holding on the fact that the investors in ques-
tion were protected under the federal banking laws,'47 but cautioned that
each transaction must be evaluated on its own. 148 Thus if the scope of the
alternative act does not include all the investments that may be regulated
under the Securities Acts, these unregulated investments should be sub-
ject to those Acts. 149
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1984). Facts are considered material if "there is a substantial likeli-
hood that an ordinary investor would have considered them important in deciding
whether or not to puchase the securities." Little v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 650 F.2d 218, 222
(9th Cir. 1981).
143. Section 10 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facil-
ity of any national securities exchange-
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in -the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982). Although not explicit in the statute, "the existence of a private
cause of action for violations of [10(b)] . . .is now well established." Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 196 (1976).
144. Section 4b of the Commodity Exchange Act provides in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful (1) for any member of a contract market, or for any
correspondent, agent, or employee of any member, in or in connection with any
order to make, or the making of, any contract of sale of any commodity in
interstate commerce, made, or to be made, on or subject to the rules of any
contract market, for or on behalf of any other person ... (A) to cheat or
defraud or attempt to cheat or defraud such other person ....
Commodity Exchange Act § 4b, 7 U.S.C. § 6b (1982).
145. Hirk v. Agri-Research Council, Inc., 561 F.2d 96, 104 (7th Cir. 1977); see also 2
P. Johnson, supra note 1, § 5.39, at 311 (Section 4b of the CEA and § 10b of the '34 Act
"serve similar puposes. . . although they are not similarly worded."). Compare supra
notes 143 with supra note 144.
146. Commodity Exchange Act § 22(a)(1)(B), 7 U.S.C. § 25(a)(1)(B) (1982). Although
the CEA antifraud statute does not require materiality, it is likely that the courts will
imply a materiality requirement similar to that of SEC Rule lob-5. I A. Bromberg & L.
Lowenfels, supra note 1, § 4.6, at 82.370; see CFTC v. United States Metals Depository
Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149, 1159, 1160 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
147. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559 (1982)
148. See id. at 560 n.ll.
149. In Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir.), vacated as moot, 459 U.S.
1026 (1982), the Seventh Circuit held that because the clear, statutory authority of the
CFTC over commodity options on securities is "plenary. . .there is no need for com-
pounding the regulation by adding the SEC." Id. at 1159 (emphasis added) (relying on
THE HOWEY TEST
The CEA regulates all commodity "5 ° futures contracts traded on a
contract market designated as such by the CFTC. 5 Because it is unlaw-
ful to trade futures contracts outside a market, 52 the CEA, in effect,
regulates all futures contracts. The CEA expressly regulates all accounts
involving futures contracts that are traded on a contract market.1 5
3
Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982) and International Bhd. of Teamsters v.
Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979)). The court in Board of Trade, in holding that the SEC was
pre-empted from regulating commodity options on securities, clearly relied on the fact
that the CFTC's authority over commodity options was explicit and full.
150. The CEA defines "commodity" by listing a number of commonly traded com-
modities, Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982), but states that the
term "commodity" also includes "all other goods and articles. . and all services, rights,
and interests in which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future dealt
in," id. This expansive definition of "commodity" was added in the 1974 amendments to
allow regulation of the increasing number of items that had become the subject of futures
contracts. See H.R. Rep. No. 975, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-42 (1974); 1 P. Johnson, supra
note 1, § 1.01, at 2-4.
Section 2(a)(1)(A) explicitly excepts any sale of a commodity for deferred shipment or
delivery when such shipment is actually anticipated. Commodity Exchange Act
§ 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982); CFTC v. Co Petro Mktg. Group, Inc., 680 F.2d 573,
576-77 (9th Cir. 1982).
151. Commodity Exchange Act § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
152. Id. § 4, 7 U.S.C. § 6 (1982).
153. Id. § 2(a)(1)(A), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982). Section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Ex-
change Act provides:
That the Commission shall have exclusive jurisdiction, except to the extent
otherwise provided in section 2a of this title, with respect to accounts, agree-
ments (including any transaction which is of the character of, or is commonly
known to the trade as, an "option", "privilege", "indemnity", "bid", "offer",
"put", "call", "advance guaranty", or "decline guaranty"), and transactions in-
volving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed
on a contract market designated pursuant to section 7 of this title or any other
board of trade, exchange, or market, and transactions subject to regulation by
the Commission pursuant to section 23 of this title.
7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Section 2(a)(1)(A) further states:
That, except as hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i)
supersede or limit the jurisdiction at any time conferred on the Securities and
Exchange Commission or other regulatory authorities under the laws of the
United States or of any State, or (ii) restrict the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission and such other authorities from carrying out their duties and responsi-
bilities in accordance with such laws.
Id.
A problem that has divided the courts, and which is beyond the scope of this Note, is
how to be consistent in interpreting the CEA's language of "exclusive jurisdiction" and
the SEC "savings clause." The grant of exclusive jurisdiction is so broad, including any
kind of transaction "involving" a futures contract, that it is not clear what type of com-
modity transactions still come under SEC jurisdiction.
The courts have split at least four ways on the issue of whether discretionary commod-
ity accounts are "saved" by the SEC savings clause. See Mordaunt v. Incomco, 686 F.2d
815, 816 (9th Cir. 1982) (discretionary commodity accounts not within CFTC exclusive
jurisdiction), cert denied, 105 S. Ct. 801 (1985); Peavey Co. v. Mitchell, [1983-1984
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCII) 99,593, at 97,337 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 30,
1983) (SEC pre-empted but investors may maintain private action under Securities Acts);
Gonzalez v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc., [1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L
Rep. (CCH) % 98,867, at 94,514 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 10, 1982) (Securities Acts pre-empted);
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In In re Federal Bank & Trust Co. Securities Litigation,'54 plaintiffs
entered into a discretionary commodity account with the defendants' 55
in which all trading in futures contracts was to be done in the Baha-
mas.15 6 Concerning a claim for commodity fraud, the court held that
because the CEA regulates only those accounts that involve futures con-
tracts traded on CFTC designated contracts markets, 57 the Bahamas
trades were not covered and the plaintiffs were therefore not protected
under the CEA. 58 Thus, although the commodities laws specifically reg-
ulate discretionary commodity accounts by protecting investors in a way
similar to that of the securities laws, some discretionary accounts may
not fall within the scope of the CEA.I5 9 In Federal Bank, the investors'
only federal remedy may have been under the Securities Acts.
Following the Supreme Court's directive that each transaction should
be examined separately,"6° discretionary commodity accounts that are
unregulated by the commodities laws should be distinguished from those
that are so regulated, and those accounts that do not come under the
specific regulation of the commodities laws should be subject to the Se-
curities Acts.
CONCLUSION
Because the definition of security in the Securities Acts included "in-
vestment contract" as a catch-all to bring various investment schemes
within federal regulation, the Supreme Court has defined the phrase
broadly. Discretionary ,ommodity accounts that are not regulated by the
commodity laws should be subject to regulation by the Securities Acts.
Comprehensive CEA regulation, however, exempts most discretionary
commodity accounts from regulation under the Securities Acts. Thus,
those accounts that are regulated by the commodities laws should be
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CEA.
Bradley D. Johnson
Mullis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 492 F. Supp. 1345, 1350-51 (D.
Nev. 1980) (SEC regulation pre-empted, but investors may maintain private action under
Securities Acts if account was mainly a discretionary securities account).
154. [1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 91,565 (D. Or. June 4, 1984).
155. Id. at 98,876.
156. Id. at 98,873.
157. See id. at 98,880.
158. Id. at 98,881.
159. Under section 2(a)(1)(A) of the Commodity Exchange Act, an account is within
the jurisdiction of the CEA if it involves a futures contract. See 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
Thus, as long as the account involves one futures contract traded on a contract market,
the CEA should have jurisdiction over that account.
160. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 560 n.ll (1982).
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